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[L. A. No. 23524. In Bank. Apr. 26, 1955.J

PIETRO FERRO, Respondent, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL
TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK OF LOS ANGELES,
Appellant.
[L. A. No. 23525.

In Bank.

Apr. 26, 1955.]

MONARCH WINE COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Re·
spondent v. CITIZENS NA TIONAL TRUST AND
. SAVINGS BANK OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant.
[1] Pledges-Trust Character of Relation.-A pledgee of collateral
security for payment of debt is trustee of pledgor.
[2] Insurance-Persons Entitled to Proceeds: Trusts-Following
Trust Property.-Jnsurance proceeds of insured wine, which
was destroyed by fire while stored with winery, take place of
wine, and when such proceeds come into possession of loss
payee holding policy as collateral security for its loans to
winery, they become subject to trust established by pledge.
[3] Pledges-Application of Proceeds-Surplus.-After pledgee of
insurance policy has applied insurance proceeds to discharge

[1] See Cal.Jur., Pledges, § 31; Am.Jur., Pledge and Collateral
Security, § 43 et seq.
Mc.K. Dig. References: [1] Pledges, § 22; [2,8] Insurance, § 220;
Trusts, § 272; [3J Pledges, § 78; [4] Assumpsit, § 7; [5J Money
Received, § 24(1); [6, 7] Insurance, § 220; [9] Trusts, § 276(1);
[10] Trusts, § 283; [11] Money Received, § 28; [12,13] Trusts,
§330; [141 Trusts, §314; [15] Trial, §228; [16] Damages, §198;
{17J Tl'1JS\.'S, i S36; [18] Damages, § 43.
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obligation secured by pledge, it is obliged, on satisfaction
thereof, to return any surplus to pledgor. (Civ. Code, § 3008.)
Assumpsit-Effect of Express Contract-Contract Fully Performed.-General rule that common count will not lie to enforce express contract does not apply if plaintiff owes no
further performance under contract and nothing remains to
be done thereunder except payment of money by defendant,
in which case payment can be recovered under complaint
stating common count for money had and received.
Money Received-Pleading.-In action by owner of wine destroyed by fire against loss payee holding policy as collateral
security for its loans to winery on whose premises wine was
stored, complaint based on common count for money had
and received stated cause of action, where defendant exercised
its rights under pledge to satisfy plaintiff's debts out of insurance proceeds, so that nothing remained to be done but
payment by defendant of surplus to plaintiff.
Insurance-Persons Entitled to Proceeds.-Provision in fire
policy that "Loss .•• [shall] be adjusted with and .•. payable to the insured specifically named herein" does not entitle
insured winery to insurance proceeds in excess of insurable
interest of loss payee holding policy as collateral security
for its loans to winery, since such provision merely defines
obligation of insurer and is intended to protect insurer by
permitting it to pay named insured and be thereafter free
of elaims by other persons who might have interest in lost
property; it does not give pledgee right to transfer such
proceeds to insured nor prevent insured, owner of wine and
pledgee from expressly agreeing to different arrangement.
ld.-Persons Entitled to Proceeds.-In action by owner of
wine destroyed by fire against loss payee holding policy as
eollateral security for its loans to winery on whose premises
wine was stored, defendant's contention that it was merely
acting as collection agent for insured winery is rebutted by
testimony that defendant "insisted" that it be last to endorse
claim drafts issued by insurer and that it control disposition
of all insurance proceeds, and by testimony of winery's president that defendant was not acting as mere agent of winery
but that winery was obliged to "follow the procedure set down
by [defendant]" for handling and disposition of funds.
Id.-Persons Entitled to Proceeds: Trusts-Following Trust
Property.-Insurance proceeds take place of insured chattel
and named insured holds proceeds in trust for owner of chattel,
and if such proceeds come into possession of third person who
has notice of trust and of interest of beneficial owner, he
likewise holds them in trust.

[4} See Oal.Jur.2d, Assumpsit, § 10; Am.Jur., Assumpait, § 7.
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[9] Trusts-Following Trust Property-Knowledge or Notice of
Transferee.-Loss payee having possession of insurance proceeds of insured wine with actual knowledge of wine owner's
interest commits breaches of trust by allowing such proceeds
to be used to pay insured winery's unsecured creditors, by
commingling such proceeds with those of building and equipment insurance, by paying itself winery president's personal
debt and winery's unsecured debt, and by delivering remainder
of proceeds to winery without paying wine owner and without
notice to such owner that it was thus disposing of proceeds,
and fact that winery was also obligated to pay wine owner
and that such owner might have recovered its share of proceeds from winery before its bankruptcy cannot excuse loss
payee's breach of its trust obligation to wine owner.
[10] ld. - Following Trust Property - Knowledge or Notice of
Transferee.-In action by owner of wine to recover proceeds
of fire policy from loss payee holding policy as collateral
security for its loans to winery on whose premises wine was
stored, jury could reasonably conclude that loss payee should
have known that possibility of payment of wine owner's
. claim was both doubtful and hazardous where, for several
years before fire, loss payee had continuous course of dealings
with winery and kept informed of winery's financial condition, where at time of fire loss payee held approximately
$4,000 worth of trade acceptances on which winery had defaulted and which were paid from insurance proceeds, and
where, though it led winery to believe it would not call
winery's mortgage obligation of $81,000, it did call such
obligation and paid it off from such proceeds.
[11] Money Received-Ina.tructions.-In action by owner of wine
destroyed by fire to recover proceeds of fire policy in defendant's possession as 10RS payee, jury were not inadequately
instructed as to what could bp found to be "wrongful" payment by defendant to winery of insurance proceeds covering
owner's wine where, considering instructions as whole, jury
eould not have been under misapprehension as to judge's
meaning in use of word "wrongful."
[12] Trusts-Establishment of Trust-Instructions.-In action by
owner of wine destroyed by fire to recover proceeds of fire
policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, an instruction
that defendant became involuntary trustee and held property
for plaintiff's benefit if defendant wrongfully acquired or
wrongfully detained plaintiff's property is not necessarily inconsistent with instructions informing jury of consequences
of lawful acquisition but wrongful disposition of plaintiff's
property.
[IS] Id. - Establishment of Trust - Instructions. - In action by
e'MJW.l' Gf wine d.estroyed by fire to :recoWl' P"l009aa fIJi. _
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policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, instructions
that plaintiff could not recover if he "authorized or consented" or "consented and agreed" to payment by defendant
to insured winery are not in conflict with earlier instruction
using words "assented to or acquiesced in" if word "acquiescence" in such instruction referred to laches.
[14] Id.-Establishment of Trust-Defenses.-Mere acquiescence
is not defense to action against trustee for breach of trust.
[16] Trial - Special Verdicts. - Direction of special verdicts is
within discretion of trial judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 625.)
[16] Damages-IJ:.structions.-In actions by owners of wine destroyed oy fire to recover proceeds of fire policy in defendant's
possession as loss payee, it is proper to instruct jury that if
verdict is returned for one or more plaintiffs jury must
determine amount of money particular plaintiff is entitled to
whete amount due to one plaintiff could be ascertained by
multiplying gallons destroyed by amount such wine was worth
and then suhtracting amount of plaintiff's debt to defendant,
and where amount of other plaintiff's loss was amount which
he paid for destroyed wine, which was less than amount of
insurance proceeds attributable to that wine.
[17] Tru..ts-Establishment of Trust-Relief Granted.-In actions
by owners of wine destroyed by fire to recover proceeds of
fire policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, it is not
proper to exclude from computation of amount of recovery
a draft that was used to pay insured winery's attaching
creditors and draft on which a warehouse company was named
as payee where these drafts were within defendant's possession and control, where one draft was paid without notice
to either plaintiff and one plaintiff's agreement to use the
other draft to pay winery's creditors was made in reliance
on defendant's assurance that he would be paid from remaining proceeds, and where defendant had knowledge of
each plaintiff's interest in insurance proceeds and assured each
that those proceeds would be adequate to pay their claims.
[18] Damages-Interest.-In actions by owners of wine destroyed
by fire to recover proceeds of fire policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, plaintiffs are entitled to recover interest
on portion of insurance proceeds to which they are entitled
from date of wrongful disbursement thereof, where such
damages are capable of being made certain on such date except
for dispute as to amount of shrinkage on one plaintiff's wine,
which is not included in amount of recovery.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angel~s County. Arthur Coats, Judge.- Affirmed.
• ~ed

bl Chainnaa

of Judicial Council.
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Actions to recover proceeds of insurance policy in defendant's possession as loss payee. Judgments for plaintiffs
affirmed.
Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, Leonard A. Diether
and Edward A. Nugent for Appellant.
Jerome Weber and Jack Altman for Respondent
23524.

III

No.

Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and George K. Hartwick
for Respondent in No. 23525.
TRA YNOR J .-Defendant appeals from judgments in
favor of plaintiffs Ferro and Monarch in actions that were
separately filed but were consolidated for purposes of trial
and appeal. In these actions plaintiffs seek to recover insurance proceeds paid for their wine, which was destroyed by
fire while stored with Sunnyside Winery. These proceeds
came into defendant's possession, and plaintiffs contend that
defendant held them in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs and
that defendant breached that trust by its disposition of
these proceeds and by its failure to pay them to plaintiffs.
The storage facilities of Sunnyside Winery were operated
as a field warehouse by the Lawrence Warehouse Company.
Of the 297,117 gallons of wine stored therein on February
8, 1950, the Lawrence Warehouse Company's inventory
showed that Ferro owned 200,237 gallons, Monarch owned
83,000 gallons, Federal Wine and Liquor Company owned
6,100 gallons, Cella Vineyards owned 200 gallons, and Sunnyside owned 7,580 gallons. All of this wine and a part of
Sunnyside's winery were destroyed by fire on February 8,
1950. Pursuant to contracts with the owners of the wine,
Sunnyside paid the premiums on several policies of insurance
covering all of the wine in storage. It also maintained
insurance on its buildings and equipment. Defendant was
named loss payee in all of these insurance policies. Sunnyside and its president, Felix Butte, had been clients of
defendant since 1947 and defendant had occasionally made
loans to Sunnyside on its wine. Defendant held the policies
as collateral security for its loans and retained possession
of them even when there were no loans outstanding in order
to facilitate the making of a new loan to Sunnyside when
the occasion for it arose.

....
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At the time of the fire Sunnyside owed defendant $81,000
on a note secured by $25,000 in bonds and a deed of trust and
a chattel mortgage on its plant and equipment. The insurance policies insured the plant and equipment for a maximum
of $800,000. Defendant also held approximately $4,000 worth
of trade acceptances on which Sunnyside was in default.
On the same date Felix Butte, president of Sunnyside, owed
defendant $23,000 on an unsecured personal note; Ferro
owed defendant $52,636.67. which was secured by warehouse
receipts for the 200,237 gallons of wine stored by Ferro at
Sunnyside; and Monarch owed defendant $42,000 on two
unsecured trade acceptances representing the purchase price
of the wine stored at Sunnyside, which Monarch had purchased through an escrow conducted by defendant.
After the fire the insurance loss for all of the wine was
adjusted at $136,440.49 and for the buildings and equipment
at $202,000. Defendant insisted that Sunnyside, the named
insured, endorse the insurance claim drafts, that defendant
be the last to endorse the drafts, and that defendant collect
them and control all of the proceeds received therefrom.
Before any of the drafts were collected, however, unsecured
creditors of Sunnyside, with claims totalling approximately
$35,000, attached the monies in the hands of the insurers.
On April 20, 1950, Butte arrived at defendant's place of
business with the first claim draft from one of the seven
wine insurers in the amount of $40,932.15. At this time a
conference took place between Butte, defendant, and Ferro's
attorney; Monarch was not represented. To obtain a release
of the attachments, an agreement was reached whereby defendant would endorse the $40,932.15 draft, which would then
be forwarded for payment of Sunnyside's unsecured creditors
to the sheriff of San Francisco, who was named a payee
because of the attachment. Ferro signed a written authorization for that disposition of this draft in reliance on the
further agreement that defendant would collect all of the
remaining proceeds of the wine insurance and the building
and equipment insurance and allocate it among the several
owners of the property that was destroyed by the fire and
in reliance on the assurance of defendant and an insurance
adjuster, who was present at the meeting, that the remaining
proceeds were more than ample to cover all of the claims.
Defendant endorsed the $-10,932.15 draft, and it was forwarded to the sheriff of San l"rancisco. Sunnyside's unsecured creditors were paid, the atti1chments were released, and

)
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the balance remaining (approximately $6,000) was paid to
Sunnyside. At the time of its endorsement, defendant knew
that the claim draft represented proceeds of the wine insurance, and that the proceeds would be used to pay unsecured
credit.ors of Sunnyside. It was also aware that Sunnyside
owned only 7,580 gallons of the wine and that the remaindp.r
was owned by Ferro, Monarch, Federal Wine and LiqutJr
Company, and Cella Vineyards, in the proportions indicated
in the Lawrence Warehouse Company's inventory, a copy of
which was given defendant at the April 20th meeting.
After the attachments were released, defendant collected
all but one of the remaining claim drafts on both the wine
and the building and equipment insurance. Its collections
from the insurers of the wine totalled $85,275.30, and collections from the building and equipment insurers totalled
$183,000. The monies thus collected from the different types
of insurance were not kept separate, but were commingled,
and reduced to cashier's checks drawn on defendant and payable to defendant. The only claim draft that defendant did
not collect was one on which the Lawrence Warehouse Company was a payee. Lawrence refused to endorse, and
defendant held it until July 27, 1950, when it forwarded the
draft to Sunnyside.
By June 27, 1950, defendant's collections were substantially
complete, and on that date it took $52,636.67 thereof to satisfy
Ferro's debt to it. Late in June, Ferro's attorney learned
that defendant had received the insurance money, but when
he inquired about it, one of defendant '8 officers told him
that defendant could not give out information about the
insurance proceeds without the authorization of Butte. On
JUly 5, 1950, defendant used insurance proceeds to satisfy
all of the obligations owed to it by Butte and Sunnyside,
except the $81,000 due from Sunnyside on its building loan.
Monarch's obligation had come due before the insurance
proceeds were collected. At defendant's insistence and in
reliance on defendant's assurance that it would be reimbursed
out of the insurance proceeds, Monarch paid its obligations
on the due date. On July 6, 1950, defendant sent cashier's
checks aggregating $60,000 to Sunnyside. Defendant retained
another $60,000 in cashier's checks payable to itself as well
as the $10,223.04 claim draft on which the Lawrence Warehouse Company was namrd as a payee. Shortly thereafter it
received the :tiual payment from the insurera in the amount

408
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of $45,000. Neither Ferro nor Monarch had any knowledge
of these transactions prior to July 6, 1950.
On July 19, 1950, Monarch wired defendant: "We understand that the insurance moneys were collected on fire loss
at Sunnyside Winery, Fresno. Amount due us on fire loss
is approximately $35,000. We have been informed money is
in your possession. Please be informed that we look to you
for check in payment of amount due to us on fire loss." On
this date defendant had in its possession commingled insurance proceeds in the amount of $105,000, as well as the
$10,223.04 claim draft 01.& which Lawrence Warehouse Company was a payee. On July 21, 1950, defendant used $81,000
of the proceeds in its possession to satisfy Sunnyside's building loan, and the remainder of the proceeds was delivered to
Sunnyside. On July 24, 1950, defendant wrote Monarch:
"Please be advised that we do not hold any moneys representing insurance proceeds on loss by fire of wine inventory
at Sunnyside Winery, Fresno. California. It is respectfully
suggested that you communicate with the Sunnyside Winery
and Mr. Felix Butte, Jr., to whom or to whose order such
proceeds were paid." On July 27, 1950, defendant .sent the
$10,223.04 draft to Sunnyside. In November 1950 Sunnyside
was declared insolvent. Neither Ferro nor Monarch was
paid for their wine that was lost in the fire, and in this
action they seek to hold defendant responsible for their loss.
The Ferro Oase
Ferro pledged (Civ. Code, §§ 2986, 2987) the warehouse
receipts for his wine as collateral security for the payment
of his debt to defendant. [1] A pledgee of collateral security for the payment of a debt is a trustee of the pledgor.
(Hudgens v. Ohamberlain, 161 Cal. 710, 715 [120 P. 422] ;
Sparks v. Oaldwell, 157 Cal. 401, 403 [108 P. 276]; Haber
v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445, 452 [35 P. 1035] ; Wade v. Markwell
&- 00., 118 Cal.App.2d 410, 426 [258 P.2d 497, 37 A.L.R.2d
1363] .) [2] After the wine was destroyed, the insurance
proceeds tool< the place of the wine (Oalifornia Ins. 00. v.
Union Oompress 00., 133 U.S. 387, 410 [10 S.Ct. 365, 33 L.Ed.
730] ; American Eagle Fire Ins. 00. v. Gayle, 108 F.2d 116,
119; Oentury Ins. 00. v. First Nat. Bank, 102 F.2d 726.
728), and when those proceeds came into defendant's possession they likewise became subject to the trust established by
the pledge. (Haber v. Brown, supra, 101 Cal. 445, 452;
Ponce v. McElvy, 47 Cal. 1!54. Hi9-160; Tracy v. Stock A.ssurcmce Bureau, 132 Cal.App. 573, 580 [23 P.2d 41); al Cal.
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Jur., "Pledges," § 72; see also Cushmg v. Building Assn.
etc. vI Psychology, 165 Cal. 731, 737-738 l134 P. 3241; Lucas
v. Associacao Profectora etc. Da Calif., 61 Cal.App.2d 344.
351-352 [143 P.2d 53].) [8] Defendant could properly apply those proceeds to discharge the obligation secured by the
pledge, but upon satisfaction thereof, it was obliged to return
any surplus that remained to the pledgor, Ferro. (Civ. Code,
§ 3008; Hudgens v. Chamberlain, supra, 161 Cal. 710. 715;
Sparks v. Oaldwell, supra, 157 Cal. 401, 403; MacDonald v.
Pacific Nat. Bank, 66 Cal.App.2d 357, 365 [152 P.2d 360];
see also Baird v. Olsheski! 116 CaLApp. 109. 111 [2 P.2d
493] .) I ts fail ure to do so was a breach of trust.
Defendant contends, however, that a pledge is an express
contract, that it was not pleaded in Ferro's complaint, and
that it would therefore be improper to allow recovery on
the theory of breaoh of trust. Ferro did plead a common
count for money had and received, but defendant contends
that" such a count will not lie to enforce an express contract,"
citing Barrere v. Somps, 113 Cal. 97, 101 [45 P. 177. 572J.
[4] The genera] rule thus stated by defendant does not
apply if the plaintiff owes no further performance under
the contract and nothing remains to be done thereunder except
the payment of money by the defendant. Payment can then
be recovered under a complaint stating a common count for
money had and received. (Willett &- Burr v. Alpert, 181
·Cal. 652, 659 [185 P. 976] ; Oasfagnino v. Balletta, 82 CaL
250, 257-258 [23 P. 127] ; Haggerty v. Warner, 115 Cal.App.
2d 468, 474 [252 P.2d 373] ; Abbott v. Limited Mut. Oomp.
Ins. 00., 30 CaLApp.2d 157. 165 [85 P.2d 961]; see also
McOlure v. Alberti, 190 Cal. 348, 351 [212 P. 204].) The
latter rule was recognized in the Barrere case, for the court
there expressly pointed out that the plaintiff's contractual
obligation was still executory. [5] Ferro's obligation under
the pledge contract was to pay his debt to defendant. When
the insurance proceeds for Ferro's wine came into defendant's
possession they became subject to the pledge, and when defendant exercised its rights under the pledge to satisfy
Ferro's debt out of t.hose proceeds nothing remained to be
done but the payment by defendant of the surplus to Ferro.
Ferro's complaint ther('fore properly stated a cause of action
for the enforcement of this obligation.
[6] Defendant also contends that because Sunnyside was
the named insured ill the insurance policies and because the
policies provided that the "Loss . • • (shall] be adjusted
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with and . • • payable to the insured specifically named
herein," Sunnyside, rather than Ferro and Monarch, was
legally entitled to the insurance proceeds in excess of defendant's insurable interest, which was protected by the
commodity loss payable endorsement that appeared on each
policy. The simple answer to this contention is that the
provision in the insurance policy defines only the obligation
of the insurer. (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank,
7 Ca1.2d 718, 725, 726-727 [62 P.2d 735] ; Mutual Life Ins.
00. v. Henes, 8 Cal.App.2d 306, 310-311 [47 P.2d 513].) The
provision is intended to protect the insurer by permitting it
to pay the named insured and to be thereafter free of claims
by other persons who might have an interest in the lost
property. The insurance policy did not give defendant a
right to transfer the proceeds to Sunnyside, and did not
prevent Sunnyside, Ferro, and defendant from expressly
agreeing to a different arrangement (ibid.), as defendant's
satisfaction from the insurance proceeds of Butte's and
Sunnyside's unsecured debts clearly shows.
[7] Moreover, defendant's repeated contention that it was
merely acting as a collection agent for Sunnyside is I'ebutted
by the testimony of several witnesses that defendant "insisted " that it be the last to endorse the claim draft and
that it control the disposition of all of the insurance proceeds,
and by Butte's testimony that defendant was not acting as
a mere agent of Sunnyside but that, instead, Sunnyside was
obliged to "follow the procedure set down by [defendant]"
for the handling and disposition of these funds.
The Monarch Oase
The judgment in favor of Monarch must also be affirmed
on the ground of breach of trust. Shortly after the fire
but before any of the insurance proceeds were received.
Leo Star, president of Monarch, had two conferences with
one of defendant's officers who assured him that there was
ample insurance to cover all of the stored wine, including
that of Monarch, and that Monarch therefore "had nothing
to worry about." On April 20th (the day the first claim
draft for $40,932.15 came into defendant's possession) defendant was given a copy of the Lawrence Warehouse Company's inventory showing that Monarch owned 83,000 gallons
of wine that had been rlestroyed. On the same day, and
without notice to Monarch, defendant endorsed the $40,932.15
claim draft, which waR a part of the proceeds of the wine
insurance, and delivered it to Butte with 1w.owJ.edae that it

)
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would be used to pay Sunnyside's unsecured creditors. Thereafter, defendant collected all of the proceeds of both the wine
and the building and equipment insurance, with the exception
of the $10,223.04 claim draft on which the Lawrence Warehouse Company was named as a payee. Defendant commingled
these proceeds, and reduced them to cashier's checks drawn
on itself and payable to itself. (Cf. Civ. Code, § 2236.)
From these commingled proceeds it paid itself Ferro's debt,
Butte's personal debt, Sunnyside's unsecured debt, and delivered $60,000 to Sunnyside. After these transactions were
completed, Monarch wired defendant that it was advised that
defendant was in possession of the insurance proceeds and
that Monarch was looking to defendant for payment of its
claim. At that time defendant had in its possession $105,000
of the commingled proceeds, in addition to the uncollected
claim draft on which the Lawrence Warehouse Company was
named payee. The day after receiving Monarch's telegram,
defendant used $81,000 of the commingled proceeds to pay
off Sunnyside's building loan. The remainder of the proceeds was ultimately forwarded to Sunnyside.
[8] It is established that insurance proceeds take the place
of the insured chattel, and that the named insured holds the
proceeds in trust for the owner of the chattel. (Oalifornia
Ins. 00. v. Union Congress Co., 133 U.S. 387, 410 [10 8.Ct.
365, 33 L.Ed. 730] ; American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Gayle,
108 F.2d 116, 119; Century Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Banlc, 102
F.2d 726, 728; Polley v. Daniels, 238 App.Div. 181 [264
N.Y.S. 194, 197].) If these proceeds come into the possession of a third party who has notice of the trust and
of the interest of the beneficial owner, he likewise holds them
in trust. (Ibid. ; Lucas v. Associacao Protectora etc. Da Calif.,
61 Cal.App.2d 344, 351-352 [143 P.2d 53] ; 3 Scott on Trusts
§§ 324.3, 324.4.) [9] It is clear that before defendant
disposed of any of the insurance procee-tis in its possession,
it had actual knowledge that Monarch owned 83,000 gallons
of the destroyed wine. Thereafter, defendant committed
several breaches of trust by allowing proceeds of the wine
insurance to be used to pay Sunnyside's unsecured creditors,
by commingling the wine insurance proceeds with those of
the building and equipment insurance and paying itself
Butte's personal debt and Sunnyside's unsecured debt, and
by delivering the remainder of the proceeds to Sunnyside
without paying Monarch and without notice to Monarch that
it W&& ~ dis,poiiDi of the proceeds. The fact that SnnD¥\

i
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side was also obligated to pay Monarch and that Monarch
might have recovered its share of the proceeds from Sunnyside (before its bankruptcy in November 1950) cannot excuse
defendant's breach of its trust obligation to Monarch.
[10] Moreover, there is evidence from which it can be
inferred that defendant knew at the time it delivered a part
of the insurance proceeds to Sunnyside that Sunnyside's
financial condition was such that the possibility of Monarch's
and Ferro's claims being paid by Sunnyside was both doubtful
and hazardous. For several years before the fire, defendant
had a continuous course of dealings with Sunnyside and kept
informed of the latter's financial condition. At the time of
the fire defendant held approximately $4,000 worth of trade
acceptances on which Sunnyside had defaulted. These acceptances were paid from insurance proceeds in July 1950.
Defendallt knew that Sunnyside urgently needed financing,
and it led Sunnyside to believe that it would not call the
latter's mortgage obligation of $81,000. Defendant did call
that obligation and paid it off from the insurance proceeds
in its possession. At that time defendant had in its possession Sunnyside's balance sheet, dated June 15, 1950, which
listed the whole of the insurance proceeds as an asset of the
corporation. In light of these facts the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant should have known that payment
of Monarch '8 claim was rendered both doubtful and hazardous
by delivery to Sunnyside of the insurance proceeds remaining
after defendant had made the disbursements mentioned above.

Instructions
A number of defendant's objections to the instructions
have already been answered by the foregoing discussion.
[11] In addition, defendant contends that the jury was
inadequately instructed as to what could be found to be a
"wrongful" payment by defendant to Sunnyside of the share
of the insurance proceeds covering Monarch's wine. Considering the instruction as a whole, and instructions 41· and
.,' The gist and substance of Monarch's claim that a constructive trust
has been established is that before the Bank endorsed the first draft of
$40,000 it had promised and agreed. or by its conduct led and induced
Monarch to believe. as a reasonably prudent person, that when it reo
ceived the insurance proceeds. it would pay to Monarch that portion of
the insurance proceeds that represented payment for Monarch's wine,
and that when the Bank did receive such proceeds, it distributed them,
or allowed them to be digtrihllted to others, knowing at the time that the
financial condition of Sunnyside was such that the disposal of these
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42- in particular, it does not appear that the jury could have
been under any misapprehension as to the trial judge's meaning in the use of the word "wrongful tJ
[12] Defendant also contends that instructions 41 and 42
are in conflict with instruction 32. t These instructions
are not necessarily inconsistent, however, for they were intended to describe the different factual situations on which
defendant's liability could be predicated. Instruction 32
informed the jury that if defendant wrongfully acquired or
wrongfully detained plaintiff's property, it became an involuntary trustee and beld the property for plaintiff's benefit.
Instructions 41 and 42 informed the jury of the consequences
of lawful a.cquisition but wrongful disposition of plaintiff's
property. There was evidence to warrant the giving of each
of these instructions.
[13] The jury was instructed that if Ferro "authorized
or consented" or "consented and agreed" to the payment by
defendant to Sunnyside he could not recover. Defendant
contends that these instructions are in conflict with an earlier
instruction using the words "assented to or acquiesced in"
in that any reference to Ferro's "acquiescence" is omitted.
funds other than to them would probably result in Monarch's being deprived of that portion of the proceeds which represented its wine.
"In this regard you must determine what facts and circumstances
have been proved, and whether the facts and circumstances found to be
proved, are themselves of such a nature as to establish a trust, the breach
of which would entitle Monarch to judgment in the action.
"The question of liability must be determined by what happened
. before the Bank disbursed the money. Whatever conversations took
place or events occurred after the money passed from the hands of the
Bank is not to be considered by you in determining the question of
liability of the Bank."
.,' In order for Monarch to recover it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence:
"The Bank knew of tIle ownership of Monarch in the wine destroyed:
"The Bank agreed to pay Monarch, or led or induced Monarch to
believe that it would pay Monarch, out of insurance proceeds that came
into its possession, the insured value of Monarch's wine.
"That the Bank thereafter paid, or allowed to be paid, to others all
of the insurance proceeds, except the amount of Ferro's indebtedness
to it, knowing at the time, or having such knowledge that, as a reason·
ably prudent person it should have known, that by such action Monarch
would not be paid for its wine, or that such payment would be doubtful
and hazardous.
t"You are instructed that a person who wrongfully detains the property of another, or a person who gains property by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act is,
unless he has some other nnll hetter right thereto. an im'oluntary trustee
of the property gained, for the benefit of the person who would other·
wise have had it."
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The instructions were not inconsistent, if the word "acquiescence" in the earlier instruction referred to laches. [14] If
"acquiescence" was intended to mean "passive submission
or acceptance" (see Webster's New Internat. Diet. [2d ed.
1942], p. 23), defendant was not prejudiced thereby since
a mere acquiescence is not a defense to an action against
a trustee for breach of trust. (Rest., Trusts, § 216 (1), comment a; 2 Scott on Trusts 1151. j
[15] Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error
for the court to refuse to give its requested instruction that
the jury must "state in [its] verdict upon which, if any, of
the respective causes of action you believe any plaintiff is
entitled to recover judgment against defendant...."
Both Ferro and Monarch stated alternative theories of recovery in three separate counts of their complaints. The
instruction requested by defendant in effect asked for special
verdicts on each of the six counts. The direction of special
verdicts is within the discretion of the trial judge. ( Code
Civ. Proc., § 625; House Grain Co. v. Finerman & Sons, 116
Cal.App.2d 485, 498 [253 P.2d 1034]; Lloyd v. Kleefisch,
48 Cal.App.2d 408, 417 [120 P.2d 97].) Nothing appears
herein to indicate that the refusal to give defendant's reqncsted instruction was an abuse of discretion.
[16] Defendant contends that the following instruction
on the measure of damages was erroneous and prejudicial:
"If you should return a verdict for one or more of the
plaintiffs against the defendant, you shall determine tht='
amount of money the particular plaintiff is entitled to. and
return a verdict for that amount, together with interest from
the 6th day of July, 1950.
"Plaintiff Ferro seeks to recover on the basis of 14 cents
a gallon for the wine destroyed by the fire.·
"Plaintiffs rsic] Monarch seeks to recover the amount paid
pcr gallon by the insurance companies for its wine stored
in the Sunnyside ,Varehouse."
*This prayer was uased on the theory, which was presented at the
trial, that Ferro's wine was worth 39 cents a ~~:dlon and that his debt
to defendant was the equi\"alent of :,?;"j cents a gallon. Since that debt
had been paid he contended that he was entitled to the remaining 14
cents. 1'his method of computation was the result of a practice established bC'fore the fire. l!'crro had agreed to sell his wine to Sunnyside
in accordance with the latter's needs from time to time. As Sunnyside
withdrew irregular lots and appropriated them to its own use, it would
send a eheck for the amount withdrawn, computed at 3!) cents a gallon,
to defendant. Defendant would retain the equivalent of 2fi cents a
gallon aull apply it to Ferro's 01: 1ig-:I tion to defendant. The equivalent
of 14 cents a ~allon would then be forwarded bl defendant to Ferro.
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The instruction was correct. Ferro's prayer for $29,174.32
was based on the assumption that he owned 208,388 gallons
of wine. Evidence was introduced to show that normal shrinkage had reduced Ferro's wine to 200,237 gallons. The jury
accepted this evidence and multiplied that figure by 39 cents.
From that total ($78,092.43) it subtracted the amount of
Ferro's debt to defendant ($52,636.67) and returned a verdict
for the remainder, $25,455.76. Monarch's loss was found to
be the amount that Monarch paid for the destroyed wine,
which was less than the amount of insurance proceeds attributable to that wine. Thus, the verdicts for both plaintiffs
were less than those that could have been returned under the
court's instructions.
[17] Defendant contends, however, that it "received"
only $85,275.30 of the total wine insurance proceeds of
$136,440.49, and thus that plaintiffs are at most entitled to
a share of that sum equivalent to the proportion that their
wine bore to the total amount of the destroyed wine and,
in Ferro's case, less the amount of his debt to defendant.
Such a computation would result in a verdict for Ferro in
the amount of $4,830.35, and for Monarch in the amount of
$23,821.74. This argument is based on the assumption that
it is proper to exclude from the computation the $40,932.15
draft that was used to pay Sunnyside's attaching creditors
and the $10,233.04 draft on which the Lawrence Warehouse
. Company was named a payee. These drafts cannot be excluded. Defendant had these drafts as well as the remainder
of the proceeds within its possession and control. It delivered
the $10,233.04 draft to Sunnyside without notice to either
plaintiff, and Ferro's agreement to the use of the $40,932.15
draft to pay Sunnyside's creditors was made in reliance on defendant's assurance that he would be paid from the remaining
proceeds. Defendant had knowledge of each plaintiff's interest in the wine insurance proceeds and it assured each of
them that those proceeds would be adequate to pay their
claims. Defendant was a trustee of those funds and was
obligated to protect plaintiffs' interests therein.
[18] It is contended that the court's instruction that
plaintiffs were entitled to interest from July 6, 1950, was
error and that plaintiffs are entitled to interest only from
the date of jUdgment. Section 3287 of the Civil Code provides
that "Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and
the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular
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day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that
day. . • . " (See Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 209-213
[195 P.2d 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380].) Plaintiffs' damages were
"capable of being made certain" on July 6, 1950, except
for the dispute over the amount of shrinkage on Ferro's wine.
There was no question but that Ferro was entitled to recover
for 200,237 gallons of wine, and the dispute over the amount
of shrinkage from the original 208,388 gallons cannot affect
the certainty of that figure. Since the jury limited recovery
to 200,237 gallons, there was no error in allowing interest.
The judgments are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonda, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J. eoncurred.
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